The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Rafael Grossi, stated on Wednesday that inspections of Iran's nuclear enrichment sites are set to happen soon. Grossi emphasized that the interim agreement between Iran and the United States includes provisions for such inspections, although he did not specify a timeline.
Political Challenges to Nuclear Inspections
In response to Grossi's comments, Iran's deputy foreign minister, Kasem Gharibabadi, remarked that the decision to allow inspectors will depend on reaching a final agreement and progress on sanctions. This statement highlights the political complexities surrounding the inspections, as Iran's parliamentary speaker labeled the interim deal a US 'declaration of defeat.'
Iran's ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva reiterated that Tehran has not yet consented to the return of IAEA inspectors. Experts believe that while comprehensive inspections are feasible in theory, significant political hurdles remain.
Technical Feasibility of Monitoring Iran's Nuclear Program
According to Georg Steinhauser, a radiochemistry professor at Vienna University of Technology, monitoring uranium enrichment is generally more straightforward due to the large scale of industrial plants involved. He stated, "Uranium enrichment takes place in large, conspicuous industrial plants. So it's inconceivable that someone secretly builds an atomic bomb in a basement and only shows the inspectors the ground floor."
The IAEA has reported that it has lost access to vital uranium enrichment facilities since attacks on Iranian sites last year. Currently, their surveillance primarily relies on satellite imagery, limiting their ability to verify Iran's uranium stockpiles or operational centrifuges.
The Need for Full Access to Verify Nuclear Intentions
Experts indicate that the key issue lies not in the technical capabilities of the IAEA but in gaining access to relevant sites. Steinhauser noted, "If this access is granted in full, then you can determine with great certainty whether a country is pursuing a civilian or a military nuclear program."
Hessam Habibi Doroh, a political scientist from the Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management, echoed this sentiment, suggesting that comprehensive inspections could be possible if a verification regime similar to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is reinstated. However, he questioned whether Iran's current leadership would be willing to make such concessions amidst ongoing military conflicts.
- IAEA's challenges: Loss of access to key facilities.
- Current uranium stockpile: Approximately 440 kilograms at 60% enrichment.
- Potential for nuclear weapons: Material could be enriched to 90% for weaponization.
🤖 This article was rewritten by Feed and Figures' editorial AI from a report originally published by DW English. Facts and quotes are preserved from the original; the rewrite focuses on clarity and structure. For the unedited original, see the source link below.
